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In Search of Mister Johnson: 
Creation, Pol i t ics, and Culture 
in Cary's A f r ica 
J . Z. K R O N E N F E L D JO Y C E Cary's Mister Johnson has been read as a novel that is about Africa and Africans, 1 and occasionally as a patronizing novel on that subject.2 It has also been 
read as a novel that is not about Africa, but about the 
human situation, or about man as creator, especially of 
himself, in a universal situation, or, indeed, about "creative 
vitality" itself.3 As such, it has been considered anything 
but patronizing. Cary's own view of the novel would 
appear to be closer to the latter than the former: "In this 
book the problems of Rudbeck making his road, his wife 
creating her independent life . . . Johnson creating his 
personal legend and the careerist making his career — all 
immersed in the world of creation — of free imagination 
— of injustice, of change — are those of actual souls 
faced with personal problems which are also universal 
ones."4 However, neither view of the book, taken simply, 
is accurate or satisfactory. As I shall attempt to show, 
as a book about the problems of self-creation, Mister 
Johnson fails to convince completely, because these prob-
lems cannot really be considered apart from their relation 
to the specifics in that background of "injustice," of 
"change," that Cary was very much aware of in general 
terms. Yet, as a book partially about a social problem 
shaped by the special circumstances of colonization it also 
falls short because Cary, although an excellent observer, 
did not sufficiently understand these problems. Both kinds 
of response to Mister Johnson are relevant. Cary, so often 
called the novelist of the "creative imagination," grouped 
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many different kinds of observations within the conceptual 
framework, "creation." His political thinking cannot be 
separated from his thinking about the artistic process. 
Mister Johnson is the embodiment of potential freedom for 
Africa and of the freedom of the artist; creation is artistic 
creation and the creation of new modes of life. This paper 
seeks to explain the effect that these linked concerns have 
on the nature of the book. As such, it will take issue with 
certain aspects of a view of the novel best expressed by 
M. M. Mahood, for whom Mister Johnson is "an unadulter-
ated work of art" quite separate from Cary's political 
theorizing, which "as he realized was not really the novel-
ist's concern.""' However, in addressing herself to the basic 
problems of the subject of Mister Johtison, and the author's 
attitude toward his major character, Miss Mahood has 
raised significant questions and established some of the 
connections crucial for my differing perception and interpre-
tation. As such, this essay owes a great deal to her work. 
When Mister Johnson is called a book about a "universal" 
situation, whether by Cary or by his readers, what they 
undoubtedly have in mind is that all of the characters — 
black and white — are seen in terms of Cary's under-
standing of universal human problems. However, there 
are some anomalies in Cary's universal intentions; there 
are inevitable limits set by our participation in our own 
cultures and by our personal conceptual frameworks on 
what we see, and even on what we call universal. The 
overall framework of the artist's freedom and responsibility 
to shape his life contains the specific framework of the 
African's freedom and responsibility: the content of the 
latter is shaped in part by cultural biases. Cary chooses 
to treat Mister Johnson's ultimate failure to mediate be-
tween freedom and responsibility in terms clearly thought 
of as universal, while, in fact, portraying him to a certain 
extent as being limited by being African (because the 
"primitive" is finally only like all of us as children). This 
accounts for one disturbing discrepancy. And universal 
C A R Y ' S A F R I C A 71 
terms finally ignore what in Johnson's being African might 
specifically explain the situation in terms other than Cary's 
chosen ones, accounting for another, in fact, conflicting 
discrepancy. Therefore, although the book does indeed 
make a claim on being "universal," its very universality 
is what makes it biased. Cary is caught in the liberal's 
dilemma: he wants to be understood as saying all men are 
basically alike; this however, makes it impossible to ex-
plain the limited possibilities of some men by taking into 
account the cultural contexts and special situations that 
might make their behavior unique. 
An examination of the novel as about the universal 
creative man, and the novel as about a man caught in a 
specific cultural predicament; of the relationship of Cary's 
conscious intentions and the results; of his general attitudes 
towards freedom and responsibility and the specific appli-
cation of them in Mister Johnson goes a long way toward 
explaining the reasons for the contradictory reactions of 
readers, and, I think, a long way towards a more complete 
and accurate assessment of the novel. Most interestingly, 
Cary himself, his portrait of Mister Johnson, and indeed 
the responses of the "universalist" critics illustrate a phen-
omenon Cary did not understand substantively enough to 
make use of — although he hovered on the edge of such 
understanding —• that all of us incorporate our new per-
ceptions and experiences into pre-existent personal and 
cultural schemes. 
The application of the level of the novel that deals with 
the universal problem of self-creation is very well given by 
M. M. Mahood in Joyce Cary's Africa (pp. 167-96). The 
insistence of the thematic imagery related to creation 
certainly gives support to the reader's feelings that this 
is Cary's overt formulation of the problem. Johnson is the 
improviser of songs, the creator of lovely S's in government 
reports, the "artist under possession of the spir it" 6 the 
shaper of situations which are given "into his hands like 
wood to be carved or a theme to be sung" (p. 32). He 
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jumps "like a ballet dancer" (p. 4), sets his "imagination 
. . . at work upon [a] theme" (p. 107), exhibits a cloth 
"with the pride of an artist showing his masterpiece" (p. 
131). The language of the novel also insists, and Mahood 
of course points out, that this problem of creating oneself, 
or finding a sustaining role in life, is one that is shared 
by almost all the characters in the novel, from Sozy, whose 
self-definition is found in the role of Johnson's helper, 
through Celia, who creates the role of "seeker after the 
primitive life," for lack of anything better to do, to Gollup, 
a creator when drunk (p. 160), and Ajali, "a kind of poet" 
in his malice (p. 69). And most significantly, the problem 
of having the freedom, like the artist, to shape one's life 
and the possibility of evading that freedom in sterile "duty," 
or evading its responsibilities in self-abandon, and thus re-
maining either a dutiful child or a willful one, is found in 
parallel in the two major characters of the novel, Rudbeck 
and Johnson. Rudbeck first needs to find freedom; Johnson 
does act as inspirer. But, in their freedom which has yet 
to know its implications and its limits, both Rudbeck and 
Johnson are child-like. Rudbeck, like Johnson, acts like a 
child when his schemes are foiled, "like a small boy being 
chafed" (p. 49). Rudbeck, "l ike Johnson, has the power 
of refusing to notice unpleasant things until they force 
themselves upon h im" (p. 93). Of course, the whole bus-
iness of building the road is for Rudbeck very much like 
a boy's passion for a new toy. It is the fact that both 
Rudbeck and Johnson take their places as children, at least 
initially, in Joyce Cary's scheme, that, of course, makes us 
qualify — by references to the intentions that the thematic 
imagery communicates — any notion that Cary is simply 
drawing a picture of the primitive as child. 
Up to a point, the "universal" and abstract themes of 
the need to exercise one's freedom in the taking of risks, 
the inevitable payment for some of those risks, and the 
need to learn to limit one's freedom by an awareness of 
the rights of other humans account for the trajectory of 
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both Rudbeck and Johnson. Freedom without responsibility 
in Rudbeck interacts with the same in Johnson. Rudbeck's 
ability to ignore everything but the present in his child-
like enthusiasm can result in his blaming Johnson, who 
is his responsibility ignored, for following his model in his 
own way. He fires Johnson peremptorily because of his 
own disappointment at the completion of the road, even 
though Johnson, in taking a rake-off from the zungo dues 
to pay for beer for the road-workers, has done nothing 
very different from what Rudbeck did at Johnson's own 
suggestion: manipulate the Treasury votes. 
However, the universal standpoint — realized in the 
themes of the artist and the child — is not consistently 
maintained (for Johnson, unlike Rudbeck, ultimately is in-
capable of any growth or self-knowledge, however tenuous) ; 
it cannot make Johnson a triumph; and finally, it cannot 
explain what happens to Johnson, the particular character. 
The treatment of Johnson as an amoral character, an artist 
creating his life, his significant consequences for the book, 
and needs to be considered critically, i.e. from a point 
of view larger than that of Cary's overt intentions. First 
in accordance with the dialectic of freedom and responsi-
bility, imaginative vision and its opposite in the book, John-
son is subject to the same framework of judgment as other 
characters in whom imagination may be an abuse, even 
though Cary wil l not blame him; this points even more 
clearly to the question: what explanation of his character 
makes judgment irrelevant? One should not confuse Cary's 
not blaming Johnson with his not seeing the adverse effects 
of his behavior. Second, rather than being an explanation 
of Johnson's character, his role as universal artist is an 
abstraction that reveals the underlying assumptions that 
made it impossible for Cary to explain him. Finally, John-
son's role as universal child-artist fails to convince and 
ultimately separates him from the other characters, indeed 
finally making him the primitive as child, in spite of Cary's 
conscious intentions. 
74 J . Z. K R O N E N F E L D 
In the context of Cary's thought and, I think, in the 
novel, freedom is a mixed thing. From one point of view, 
it is clearly positive, as the vitality and joy of Johnson 
are clearly preferable to the sterility of Benjamin who has 
an English and Christian petty clerk's superego, and of 
the traditional natives, such as Bamu and her family, who 
pay for their clear sense of their roles in life, with a 
limited horizon. It takes "energy and imagination" (p. 194) 
to break out of poverty and Johnson clearly has those 
qualities. Similarly, the risks that Rudbeck takes in "cheat-
ing" on the Brit ish colonial system are also preferable to 
the limited views of such colonial administrators as Blore, 
and of such native conservatives as the Emir and the Waziri, 
especially since related to bringing more opportunities to 
Africa via the road. Nevertheless, the dangers are also 
clear. Johnson's freedom to create may ignore the reality 
of other people, or of situations, as he ignores the reality 
of Bamu, in his wish to make her into a government lady, 
regardless of her own desires. The road will bring as much 
harm as benefit, unless colonial administrators can accept 
the challenge it presents. 
Freedom is both positive and dangerous for Cary, and it 
is with this awareness that both Mister Johnson (1939) 
and The Case for African Freedom (first published in 
pamphlet form in 1941, published in expanded form in 
1943) were written. Cary's stress on the possibility that 
order, the parallel of responsibility, may be deadening, and 
chaos, the parallel of freedom, regenerative, should not en-
courage one to conclude that he polemically favors anarchy. 
However often the comedy of freedom is also the tragedy 
of freedom, ideally freedom and responsibility are not in-
compatible. " A free man is one who has mastery, so far 
as possible, of his own life. And since his life is joined 
in greater or lesser degree with every other life, with the 
national life; the world life; with all knowledge and re-
ligion, with all movements of the spirit; he needs for that 
mastery as much wisdom as he can get. In so far as he 
refuses, consciously or unconsciously, to seek the truth, or 
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to take responsibility, he is abdicating from freedom; he 
is making himself a slave of prejudice and fear."7 
The dialectic of freedom and responsibility — the fact 
that each term can be positive or negative — and this 
ideal view of freedom as responsibility make Johnson sub-
ject to the same criticism as Celia. Cary's Celia is motivated 
by boredom, a lack of any reasonable expectations about 
her function which suddenly confronts her when she is 
thrown "out of the nursery into the inane" (p. 123). Part 
of the scorn that Cary generates for Celia in the first 
part of the novel depends on the notion that no-one could 
sincerely seek "the joys of the primitive life," unless 
blinded by other difficulties. And indeed Celia is described 
as "blind to . . . reality" (p. 117) and embarrassing in 
that blindness when she, for example, describes the local 
jail as finer than anything in England (p. 120). She is 
motivated by ideas, not a concern with truth in any sense. 
Yet, she at least sometimes thinks that she is "acting a 
part" (p. 110), she knows she is not sincere and is genuinely 
disgusted with herself (p. 123). Celia's blindness is not 
unrelated to Johnson's, though the content, and indeed the 
evaluation of it by Cary are often reversed. It is as if 
Mister Johnson illustrates the other side of the dichotomy. 
If the fascination with ideas to the exclusion of a search 
for the truth is a liability in Celia which Gary really 
scorns, imaginative feelings and ideas, even if unrelated to 
realty, may be seen as part of an ultimately greater truth 
when Johnson is compared to Ajali, for whom the truth 
is ugliness: ". . . I don' tell you the truth — I don' tell 
you how much Mister Tring 'gree for me because you so 
little small ting like stink bug. How anyone tell stink bug 
about de glory of God — he only make so bad stink he 
make you sick for belly" (p. 130). Celia is ultimately 
capable of some insight, that is, of seeing through Rudbeck's 
prejudices when she teases him for his sensitivity to the 
"wog" 's observing them swimming; she begins to "see" when 
she comes to terms with herself, within her own restricted 
limits (she comes to exist by virtue of her pregnancy). 
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However, Johnson, unlike Celia, has no capacity for growth 
or self-knowledge. His disgust with himself is as impulsive 
as his pleasure with himself. If Johnson is generous in 
giving of himself and his possessions, it is rather hard to 
credit him with this trait because it is as much a product 
of his impulsive nature interacting with chance, as is the 
murder he finally commits. There is an inherent danger in 
his undifferentiated good nature and good feelings which 
"take form . . . as . . . love of Bamu," for example (p. 
10). As universal child, Mister Johnson is primarily moti-
vated by an imagined, aesthetically pleasing idea of a role. 
We do not know his motivations, as compared to Celia's, 
we do not know why he is incapable of insight, however 
tenuous, into his own situation, we do not know what the 
reality is that he abandons for his "joys of the civilized life." 
Both Celia and Johnson are glorifiers of reality in their 
very different ways and there are dangers in both glorifica-
tions. Nevertheless, the scorn Cary generates for Celia's 
lack of insight is almost never called up for Johnson; one 
can think only of the incident in which Johnson turns 
his back on his own vision of Bamu in government lady 
clothes because the government lady likes Bamu "native." 
Unlike the other characters, the dangers of whose fantasies 
we are allowed to condemn, Johnson, for all the glories of 
his creation, is treated as a victim, but we are not certain 
what is victimizing him. 
In this context, then, one must question the conclusion 
reached by Mahood, that there "was nothing inadequate 
about the Johnson who was taking shape in Cary's imagin-
ation" (p. 171). It is not even unqualifiedly true that 
Johnson's "daydreams are far from the paranoic's delusions 
of greatness" (Mahood, p. 174). If not a paranoic, John-
son does have delusions of greatness: 
" H e my money," Johnson laughs at h im. " H e m y store, 
Mis te r Ben jamin — because I got de key to h i m . " (p. 248) 
"I k i n g of dem Kaduna . I k i n g of a l l dem country. 
I say to a l l dem policemen, open up dem prison, for c lerk 
Johnson come out." 
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"Oh , Johnson, dat fool ta lk now." 
" H o w it be fool ta lk, A j a l i ? Dey my prison, I catch 
dem key." H e holds up the kni fe i n front of A ja l i ' s eyes. 
" M e k i n g of a l l dem prison in de wor l ' . " (pp. 250-51) 
Mahood argues that Cary abandoned an idea of Johnson 
as morally ruined, and instead decided to treat him as an 
ultimate triumph, not a failure (pp. 171-72). For her, 
imagination, as it is found in Johnson (thereby making 
Celia unimaginative) is the positive value on which the book 
turns; it is failure of imagination that explains negative 
actions and attitudes, including racism. But, to see John-
son in entirely positive terms is to ignore the dialectic, 
which she elsewhere recognizes (pp. 191, 195) of freedom 
and responsibility in Cary's thought and in the book. These 
were paradoxical terms for Cary; each could contain its 
opposite, each could be positive or negative. It seems clear 
that Cary did decide not to treat Johnson as an immoral 
character: immorality implies the availability of a system 
of ethics and Cary was not in a position to describe such 
for Johnson. Johnson, for Cary's purpose, tribeless, without 
even the negatively seen system of standards that Bamu 
has, is treated as an amoral character. What does emerge 
from the book in accordance with Cary's overt conceptions 
is that Cary does not feel he can blame Johnson. "But 
as Johnson does not judge, so I did not want the reader to 
judge."8 But that is not to say that Cary did not see 
Johnson's difficulties or that he would not have welcomed 
and explanation of them, to avoid leaving the political and 
cultural questions he cared about without hope of an answer. 
Mister Johnson exemplifies that potential for creative self-
development that Cary so much wished colonial adminis-
trators to encourage, as explained in The Case for African 
Freedom. Yet the novel, more than the treatise, suggests, 
without explaining, the enormous practical complexity of 
that task. 
A n explanation of Johnson is not to be found in the 
motive of social climbing, the desire for status in itself. 
Rather, as he is presented by Cary, his social climbing 
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motivations flow directly form his overall creative impulses. 
Johnson tries to inhabit a "paradise" (p. 41) of his own 
making that just happens to take on the form of the 
English way of life. He is first of all, the creator, in accord-
ance with Cary's general scheme; his freedom to create 
gets expressed in terms of the acquisition of the material 
aspects of Western culture. The causality implied here, 
which might seem rather odd from certain points of view, 
was concordant with Cary's habit of thinking about imagin-
ative creation in a broad way that subsumed his own 
cultural biases. In The Case for African Freedom, the de-
sire for the material goods of the West, even for trivia, 
was seen as a positive impulse, an indication of the larger 
desire of the free individual to express himself, to develop 
his potential. Cary might have at first been "disgusted to 
find that ten minutes in a company store could change a 
warrior fit for the Parthenon pediment into a nigger 
minstrel." But, he goes on: 
But since then I have been struck by this point: that in 
deploring the loss of the t r iba l standards and t r iba l d ignity 
by the native, I never asked mysel f what the native him-
self wanted; I never sa id : " W h y is it that the Tulas are 
so delighted w i th the stores and the things that they can 
buy there? W h y do they f lock to earn sixpence a day 
about the station, or volunteer for the t in mines and 
the ra i lway gang? " 
It struck me that the t r iba l native is often extremely 
bored w i th t r i ba l l i fe. H e finds the same attract ion as 
Europeans in change and discovery; above a l l , i n new 
freedom, even that sma l l amount to be bought for a wage 
of sixpence a day. {Case, p. 38) 
Thus, Johnson, although on the one hand, the archetypal 
creator, seeking to shape a life, is, in terms of Cary's 
political views, free because true freedom is the freedom 
of modern, technological, democratic societies." 
This underlying specificity of thought and opinion con-
flicts with the emphasis on what amounts to an entirely 
abstract sort of motivation in the novel. Similarly, ab-
stractly speaking, the dialectic should go both ways, that is, 
Johnson should be as culpable as Celia, but he is not, 
because the glorification of the primitive life, is by Cary's 
C A R Y ' S A F R I C A 79 
standards, far worse than the glorification of the civilized 
life. These, I think, are some of the discrepancies, i.e. 
between "universalist" intentions and the theme of "crea-
tion," abstractly conceived, and specific biases inherent 
in Cary's ideas about creation, that account for the con-
flicting evaluation of the novel by critics, for the judgment 
that it is "universal" and for the judgment that it is 
patronizing. 
Aside from Rudbeck's part in it, Cary gives us no choice 
other than explaining Johnson's downfall as a result of the 
negative factors inherent in his romantic self-creation, 
which in its positive aspect creates joy, happiness and 
beauty. The sheer urge to create or maintain his role 
explains entirely contradictory actions. Thus, the idea of 
patriotism — which is as nebulous and unrelated to practi-
cal or moral considerations as his idea of English weddings 
founded on an oleograph of the royal family — moves 
him to refuse the bribe offered by the Waziri. He is 
moved without reference to any moral considerations, for 
example, of the indigeneous system, or, of some, perhaps 
conflicting mixture of what he understands of the new 
system and what claims might be made by the indigeneous 
system. And it is this refusal of the bribe that in fact 
explains his later taking of the bribe in the sense that all 
of Johnson's actions stem either from his momentary role-
creating, or from attempts to assure that he can continue 
to play the role he has created. And he needs money to 
continue the role of "government man." 
Finally, the major problem of this vision of Johnson as 
primarily motivated by his creative impulses is that it fails 
to convince completely in the climatic section of the novel, 
the murder of Gollup, whch is so shocking to the reader 
who has been made to care for Johnson. We want very 
much to read between the lines a sense of despair that 
stems from threats to Johnson's entire self-estimate. How-
ever, his self has been defined only in terms of his desire 
to play roles. Thus, we are prepared for the kill ing of 
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Gollup by the play-acting that takes place, à la gangster 
movies, when Johnson tries to get the keys to Rudbeck's 
safe. (Johnson must get documents for the Waziri so that 
the latter wil l save him from being indicted for em-
bezzlement of the worker's salaries.) There are indeed 
other factors. Johnson has been treated in a demeaning 
way by Rudbeck. It has become increasingly difficult to 
carry out his chosen role. Gollup has been playing a "heads 
I win, tails you lose" game with him all along (p. 175). 
Perhaps Johnson even fears prison, because it is fit only 
for bush people and therefore an insult to his pride. A l l 
of these factors might account for a readiness to risk all, 
and suffer death for murder rather than be imprisoned 
for robbery. But Cary almost never makes Johnson react 
in anger to Rudbeck's or Gollup's games; Johnson is made 
to have a habit of intuitively disregarding all the injustices 
he suffers — a function of his being a child. The role-
playing which has been emphasized all along, and which 
is again rehearsed when Johnson tells his plans for robbing 
Gollup's store to Benjamin, if not an "explanation," is the 
only thing offered as substantiation of the likelihood of 
Johnson's committing murder. Indeed, the other "explan-
ations" are only present in the tone of Johnson's words; 
the reason for the despair possibly behind the tone have 
to be guessed at. The murder itself does occur after Gollup 
fires his gun. But we are not even sure that Johnson was 
acting in what he might have thought of as instinctive 
self-defense when he actually used the knife he was pre-
pared to use, in imaginative anticipation. It essentially just 
happened. In terms of the scheme of the book, what we 
have is creativity gone wrong; the habit of not distinguish-
ing between reality and imagination spilling over into 
violence. Yet we understand the reasons behind that habit 
of mind better in Celia's casei and we are asked to judge 
Celia. 
After (and because of) the murder, it is no longer pos-
sible to see Johnson and Rudbeck as parallel children. 
When Johnson is caught, depression does come. But this 
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depression implies no growth; it seems to afflict his body, 
without the consent of his mind (pp. 290-291). Rudbeck 
at first stays removed from Johnson's trial; he ignores the 
part he played in Johnson's downfall. By being supercorrect, 
he attempts to show up the authorities who, he dimly feels, 
are unaware of the complexities of reality. But this is 
really no different from Benjamin's toeing the line; it is an 
evasion of his ability to act for Johnson. However, his 
final decision to shoot Johnson, rather than hang him 
according to his orders, so that Johnson may die like an 
English gentleman according to his wish, does follow a 
period of self-examination, even if the light Rudbeck shines 
into himself only illuminates a corner. Although ironically 
once again inspired by Johnson, Rudbeck does reassert a 
kind of freedom within the limits of the situation, a free-
dom that is responsibility, for it involves a recognition of 
his own part in Johnson's career and a recognition of 
Johnson's own self. Even if it is Johnson who encourages 
Rudbeck's wider perspective and Johnson's imagination 
that is the catalyst of Rudbeck's responsibility, still Rud-
beck has some insight and some responsibility. 
Mahood sees this ending mainly as a positive victory 
for Johnson. She sees Johnson as free, creating freedom 
once again for Rudbeck. "When Cary speaks of Johnson 
as the artist of his own joyful tale, he means I think that 
Johnson was able to transform a story of failure, in Cary's 
mind, into a triumph, and this is what Cary makes him 
do in the book" (p. 172). For Mahood, Cary's personal 
tension between "responsibility and abandon" comes close 
to resolution in Mister Johnson (p. 191). "It's hero is in 
some degree the completion of a triad, the natural out-
come of the dialectic between self-surrender and responsi-
bility in Cary's first three novels. . . . His responses to 
the impulse of each moment are not surrenders to the 
irrational" (p. 195). If not, what are they? In the world 
of the novel, no-one has complete clarity of moral vision. 
But some degree of self-consciousness is necessary to medi-
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ate between surrender and responsibility. Rudbeck is 
troubled, does reflect on the past and knows he has con-
tributed to Johnson's behavior. He comes closer to the 
balance in Cary's dialectic than does Johnson, who more 
than Rudbeck, does live in the fluid moment, and seems 
to have no unitary self on which to reflect, whose exercise 
of freedom is finally incompatible with any restraints or 
self-insight. The symbolic triumph of Johnson as maker 
is not enough to eradicate this difference or render irrele-
vant the question "Why does this potential to create and 
develop get destroyed"? To see the book as finally "about" 
art, however clearly one level of it supports such an interpre-
tation, is to see it too abstractly and to ignore too much 
of it. 
There may be enough explanation of Johnson's demise 
in the reality that the world of "injustice," of "change," 
even of "bad luck" always has its part in determining the 
trajectories of risk-takers, in accordance with Cary's gen-
eral scheme. If Rudbeck cheats, if Johnson defies the laws, 
consciously or unconsciously, each must pay the price ex-
acted within the existing system, whether that system is 
right or wrong, and no matter how complex the situations 
that produced their acts. The universalist view of the 
novel and Cary's apparent understanding of his own stance 
depend on the notion that Johnson does as well or as badly 
as any of us might, as we "swim, with more or less courage 
and skill for our lives." 1 0 But, we have already seen that 
this stance does not really cover what does and what does 
not happen to Johnson himself. If Johnson is indeed unlike 
the other characters, need we not consider the ways in 
which Rudbeck and he are not equally open to the vagaries 
of the unjust world and equally capable of surmounting 
difficulties, of finding a reconciliation between freedom and 
responsibility? Certainly Cary's sympathy for the Johnson 
who can so easily get blamed for imitating what his 
superiors do, as he understands it, shows that he did take 
this kind of difference into account. But only up to a 
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point. Rudbeck has precedents for how he can and should 
behave; Johnson does not. Each must pay for the conse-
quences of his own risks; yet clearly there is something 
more specific than the general exigencies of "bad luck" 
and "chance" at work. The native is more likely to be 
caught, more likely to pay more, less likely to see clear 
alternatives. 
In Art and Reality, Cary shows an awareness of the 
difficulties of learning cultural systems, which, not un-
typically, he contains within his larger interest in art. In 
order to define the essential nature of art, he describes the 
process of cultural transmission by which the child may 
find order in the chaos that surrounds him: 
. . . a wor ld of real i ty that possesses such definite forms 
both of fact and feeling, presents itself to us as chaos, a 
place fu l l of nonsense, of injustice, of bad luck ; and [that 
is] why chi ldren spend so much of their t ime ask ing 
questions. They are t r y ing to bui ld up, each for himself, 
some comprehensible idea by wh i ch to guide their conduct 
in such a terr i fy ing confusion. 
They f ind the task extremely dif f icult. Often they get 
the wrong answers to their questions, also they easily 
get the answers wrong. F o r words need interpretat ion 
and the interpretat ion depends very much, not only on 
the selection of the words, but the emphasis given to the 
words, on the qual i ty of the words and on the tone of 
voice w i th wh ich they are spoken. It is the selection, the 
emphasis, the tone, that gives the valuat ion. I f a chi ld is 
told, 'Don't eat too much cake,' and 'Don't torture the 
cat,' w i th the same mi ld emphasis, i t w i l l regard both 
actions w i th the same indulgence. 
This selection, this tone, this emphasis is a r t . 1 1 
Cary understood, then, that the difference between such 
injunctions could be conveyed only by a tonal emphasis to 
the child struggling to understand how to conduct himself 
in the world and he understood that this emphasis was 
often missing or failed to communicate for other reasons. 
Johnson, much more than Rudbeck, is the child in the 
specific colonial situation who must learn such differences 
or pay. Yet, the proper emphasis is all too readily not 
communicated: the difference between stealing from the 
Treasury by arranging votes and stealing from Gollup's 
store armed with a knife may be confused when Rudbeck 
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approves of Johnson's former idea "with a gr in" and says 
"I didn't know you were a bloody thief" (p. 95). This kind 
of explanation of Johnson's difficulties is covertly present, 
but not underscored, in the novel. 
Johnson is a child, not presumably because he does not 
have a cultural system of his own (though Cary leaves 
this out), but because he must learn the subtle nuances 
of a new system, the British. But, as we shall see more 
fully in the latter part of this paper, Cary does not com-
pletely recognize the shaping force of primitive cultures as 
on an equal level with other orderers of chaos. Thus, for 
him the primitive is easily equated with the universal child, 
as described in the quotation from Art and Reality, for 
example. This equation ultimately ignores the reality that 
African children grow up no less frequently than English 
children, however difficult or imperfect growing up may be 
in either case. Indeed, in Mister Johnson, Cary seems to 
confuse Johnson as a child in the specific situation with 
Johnson the universal child-artist struggling to shape his 
world. This amounts to confusing Johnson's lack of 
knowledge of the British system with a child's lack of 
knowledge of any system; each has to learn the system 
he is confronting, but the one has to fit the new system 
to an old while the other does not. Presumably there are 
injunctions against certain forms of wrong-doing in John-
son's own culture, against homicide, for example. But we 
do not know what these are, if they differ from British 
mores or not, and why Johnson's individual self would 
work to push them into the background. When Johnson is 
troubled, by a "dim fear that he may have infringed some 
law or regulation of the service by taking forced loans 
from laborers" (p. 29), how are we to understand it? Does 
his own system have no such injunction or a conflicting ex-
pectation? 
Aside from his lack of knowledge of Johnson's "o ld" 
system, Cary's thematic concern with our universal child-
ishness, in its negative and positive forms, is also relevant 
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to the shape Mister Johnson takes. But the theme of the 
child is a metaphor. Of course, there is a difference be-
tween being a child and being like a child, between having 
no preconceptions, no structure through which the world 
is perceived and having the ability to preceive and act 
freshly on occasion, to get out of learned ruts, or, negatively, 
to evade responsibilities or ignore realities of which one 
has some awareness. In Johnson's case, the metaphor 
become reality. Because Cary seems to have confused the 
child in the context of the colonial situation with the actual 
child, Johnson's vitality and freshness; as well as his 
irresponsibility, are finally linked to actual childishness. 
Thus, it is categorically impossible for Johnson, unlike the 
other characters, to find valuation or order in the world; 
in effect, he finally is the primitive as child, conceived as 
having no system of restraints or sanctions, no learned 
structure through which reality is perceived and ordered. 
Thus Johnson, although a fantasizer like the other char-
acters, is ultimately not to be blamed for the dangers 
inherent in his fantasies, just as the child who has 
internalized no moral system, would not be blamed. 
As someone interested in the fate of colonial Africa, Cary 
needed to understand the rules of the specific game, the 
circumstances of Johnson, the temporary child. The lack 
of attention to the responses of a seventeen year old to 
constraints of his own culture permits Cary to treat John-
son as unshaped wood on which the creative impulse carves, 
to allow other explanations of his behavior to remain in 
the background, unsought and unformulated. 
Johnson is really too naive as a character. Although the 
town of Fada is strange to him, he fails to function in 
some ways that make him unbelievable: he exchanges 
European clothes for native cloth at one tenth their value; 
he buys a hide of holes. Yet, Cary was a very good ob-
server, and strangely enough, the evidence is present in 
the book for another explanation of Johnson's behavior: 
an explanation that takes cultural factors into account, 
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although Cary's concentration on the general theme of the 
freedom of creation and some of the implications of that 
already suggested mean that he does not make such factors 
motivating ones. There is for example, an implicit argu-
ment in the book that Johnson may handle money as 
liberally as he does, not simply because of an abstractly 
conceived effort to "create" himself in pleasing terms, but 
because people unaccustomed to a cash economy handle 
money differently. More significantly, although it is not 
clear whether Johnson's party giving is meant to be under-
stood as an African imitation of Western style or not, 
Johnson acts freely with his money in an African, not a 
Western way; his parties with their provided entertainment 
and liquor are traditional West African entertainments. 
Johnson, by virtue of being a "government man," is by 
definition " r i ch " (just as Peace Corps volunteers in Africa 
discover that they are by definition rich) and he spends 
freely in the manner considered appropriate in many West 
African societies where the rich man is supposed not to 
worry too much about compensation in kind, although he 
may be rewarded in status. In this sense, Johnson's be-
havior may be explained by assuming that he has the 
same expectation of others towards him as he has for 
himself, but, of course, his expectations are not warranted. 
He is acting out of certain cultural assumptions as are the 
English; the problem is in the mutual misinterpretation. 
Cary was certainly aware of this kind of thing; Mahood 
points out that in his unpublished short story "Adamu," 
Cary hints that "Adamu's bribe-taking is just as much a 
social convention as is the A.D.O.'s readiness to risk 
Government money in cashing a cheque for an unkown 
white man" (p. 182). (Such bribes or "dashes" are a well-
known African custom.) In Mister Johnson one suspects 
that other behaviors as well might be part of local systems; 
however, when Johnson takes a rake-off off the zungo dues, 
for example, we are not given a clear framework of judg-
ment. Thus, we are most likely to see this act as an 
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imitation of Rudbeck's cheating. To summarize, then, Cary 
had thought about problems of inter-cultural communication, 
but he did not really know what was "inside" Johnson. 
And he wanted to see him in universal terms, that is, as 
the man of imagination, a formulation that for him en-
closed or contained the other problems. The evidence of 
cultural factors is there, but for Cary, the problem is not 
consciously put in this form. Perhaps this fact is not un-
related to Cary's feeling that he had simplified his original 
concerns — which included the social — when he wrote 
Mister Johnson, making it into the tale of an artist. 1 2 
Certainly our sense of the ways in which cultural assump-
tions make communication difficult is something that has 
grown in recent years; Cary cannot be expected to have 
written an anthropological novel. Indeed, anthropological 
study in Africa — in which Cary was interested — was 
only beginning at this time. But he has also not written 
a novel that is simply and convincingly about the "artist" 
in a universal situation. It is Cary's thinking about Africa 
in less than universal terms — to which we now must 
turn more explicitly — that supports and underlies the 
process by which Johnson, the child like all of us, becomes 
Johnson, the primitive as child. 
The reasons for the ultimately limited possibilities of 
Mister Johnson begin with Joyce Cary's avowed anti-
primitivism which ultimately defines Africa as a place where 
only restraints exist, a place that has to be "given" free-
dom in all its forms, because it does not nurture it itself. 
If those who think the African is unfit for civilization are 
out and out racists in Cary's terms, those who like Blore 
in the novel, think civilization is unfit for the African are 
subtly condescending and subject to Cary's scornful (and 
highly successful) mimickery: "I knew such and such a 
tribe when they were bare-arsed pagans, the finest chaps 
I ever met, honest as the day, straight as their backs, clean 
as their own rain-washed skins. And look at them now 
since they got stores and ploughs and mission schools, 
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trousers and clap. The lousiest, laziest, most worthless lot 
of mean bums that ever disfigured the dung-heap they live 
i n " (Case, pp. 37-38). Cary's anti-primitivism explains 
his contempt for Celia's romance of the primitive life; it 
explains the place in the novel where the author's voice 
suddenly intrudes in a description of Fada which gives 
vent to such contempt: "Poverty and ignorance, the absolute 
government of jealous savages, conservative as only the 
savage can be, have kept it at the first frontier of civiliza-
tion" (p. 121). 
Although in favor of progress, Cary was aware, as he 
makes Rudbeck marginally aware, that the bringing of 
changes, such as roads, creates new problems. The British 
would have to "grow up," even as Rudbeck must; the 
political responsibility of colonizers is just the personal 
responsibility of Rudbeck to Johnson writ large. A t least 
in his non-fiction, Cary's solution to the questions "what 
went wrong?" and "what do we do next?" was "total 
development." " [E] conomic development is a part of a 
complex general development; . . . supply requires a 
demand; industries need markets; and markets depend on 
factors which are often more psychological than economic; 
on habits and customs, taste, and even religious tradition. 
. . . Whenever, then, in this book, the phrase 'economic 
development' is used it must be understood to assume, as 
premise, all those other developments, social and personal, 
without which it can only be superficial and local" (Case, 
p. 1). Cary's criticism of indirect rule, which had allowed 
people like the Emir to stay in power and keep development 
at a superficial minimum parallels his concern that the 
British go beyond protecting Africans from restraints on 
their freedom (e.g. by stopping slave raiding) in order to 
give them the freedom to create for themselves. Johnson, 
whether as imitator of the West, or liberated (i.e. de-
tribalized) African, somehow has that initial capacity. 
Cary's view of Afr ica takes its particular shape as a 
result of what he did not know about it and about primitive 
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societies and of his major preoccupations with freedom and 
creation. If, unlike Conrad, he does not see Africa as a 
symbol of a place in the human soul completely without 
restraints, the ultimate difference between his view and 
Conrad's, is not as great as might be expected. Cary did 
not understand how African systems of belief about the 
nature of the world, like other such systems, work to 
provide the necessary rationales for moral and social order. 
Even if he came to understand African systems as the 
creation of humans, of free minds, and thus not as systems 
fixed for all time, but subject to change, to the fresher 
visions of the new generation (Mahood, p. 194), he certainly 
did not see much virtue in such systems.13 For Cary, 
Africa is a place largely characterized by negative restric-
tions, a place where freedom to develop human potential 
to its fullest is not naturally nurtured, and consequently, 
if not a place without restraint at all, a place where free-
dom may easily lead to chaos. Although Cary knew that 
Africa contained a great variety of cultures and govern-
ments, he tended to think of the African as "tribal man." 
The term "tribe" has little meaning: it can be used to 
describe an ethnic group, a political organization or a 
kinship unit, among other things. For Cary, the tribe is 
clearly an autocratic social organization that suppresses 
individualism. "Tribal life is inconceivably narrow and 
boring — a combination of totalitarian government and 
authoritarian church in their most oppressive forms." 1 4 
Release from the tribe, for army recruits, for example, 
besides offering the definite benefits of health care, allows 
Africans to enjoy "an independence which to us is normal, 
[but] to them is so strange that we can scarcely imagine 
it." Such independence also has its dangers: "Too much 
freedom may be as bad as too little. In South Africa 
thousands of such detribalized natives quickly went to the 
devil. The soldier and the young policeman are learning 
discipline at the same time as they practise a new freedom. 
They remain under discipline and are taught to be respon-
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sible for their health, cleanliness, and conduct"' (Case, p. 
73). Cary's attitude toward Bamu, Johnson's native wife, 
captures mostly his negative attitude towards African 
restraint. Bamu's idea of her own place and duties is well 
developed. Cary, having himself once idealized the "bare-
arsed pagan," can even see some of the advantages of 
such a position when he compares her sense of self to 
Celia's initial lack of one. But, Bamu's role is also clearly 
and most importantly a restriction on her potential; she is 
subservient to her brother and father. Her only indulgence 
of self in the book appears in conversations about what 
clearly are superstitious beliefs to Cary (and even to 
Johnson). 
It follows from Cary's idea of African society that free-
dom as he conceived it, could not be achieved within or 
make use of any existing social structures. However much 
Cary might have metaphysically understood the paradoxes 
of restraint within freedom and freedom within restraint, 
he could define freedom in the treatise and the novel, only 
as the impulse towards the West, with its material and 
for him, psychological, benefits, the attraction to which is 
in itself an indication of a sense of potential. 
Johnson, however, lacks self-knowledge, the "mastery" 
of his own life, the "wisdom" that are ultimately the 
responsibility of freedom, in Cary's own terms (Case, p. 
111). If the novel asks us not to judge him as immoral, 
what will explain his failure of freedom, however uncon-
scious? Cary's vision of Africa explains why he could 
come up with no other view of the problem than that of 
the dangers inherent in the impulse towards self-creation. 
True restraint, like true freedom, can come only from the 
West. The de-tribalized army recruits Cary described in 
The Case for African Freedom receive both freedom and 
discipline from the West. Rudbeck must remain "mother 
and father" (p. 290) to Johnson. Clearly, the old restraints 
cannot embrace the new freedoms. Johnson, the universal 
creator-child is ultimately seen as the primitive as child, 
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because African cultures, having only negative restraints, 
as opposed to the restraints that can embody freedom, 
render him essentially without a moral system. The only 
way Johnson, truly blameless as children are blameless, can 
exercise the responsibilities of his new freedom is to intern-
alize Western morality. Yet, here the novel goes beyond 
the thinking in A Case for African Freedom by showing 
that "education" into civilization, which was to be part of 
going beyond mere "freedom from restraint," and which, 
on a large scale, would work as part of "total development," 
fails quite dismally. Johnson's education has been hap-
hazard —• one might argue that he fails because of in-
sufficient education — but education fails in the case of 
Benjamin. 
Benjamin, restrained but not personally or psychologically 
free, is proof of the failure of Western morality. He has 
totally internalized Christianity, can even argue against 
Johnson's robbing Gollup's store on the grounds that it will 
disturb his conscience, yet he is not happy. Ironically, the 
new restraints are really no better than the old restraints: 
while the old restraints do not allow for the expression of 
a potentially Westernized and richer self (in Cary's view) ; 
the new restraints do not allow Benjamin any expression 
of his African self. Benjamin envies Johnson his exuberant 
dancing throughout the book, yet never feels it is appropri-
ate behavior for himself. Therefore, the internalization of 
the West has become a new prison for him in several ways. 
Indeed, he wishes for an even more restrictive prison in 
which he wil l be "free," because he is restrained. Benjamin 
is like those caged birds Cary mentions in The Case for 
African Freedom who seek new cages when theirs are 
thrown open (although the novel is less than optimistic 
about that "opening"). His unexpected cheating with the 
Post Office accounts stems, it is strongly hinted, from a 
desire for imprisonment. In prison, as he earlier said, one 
"wouldn't be afraid to lose his job — he'd be more free" 
(p. 53). Benjamin is "abdicating from freedom" (Case, p. 
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111) ; he has become a slave to fear. His new role makes 
it impossible for him, even more than for Johnson, to go 
back to "bush" ways; he is so afraid of losing the only 
life he has that he would rather go to prison than live 
in fear of losing it. Thus, the book reaches a complex 
stalemate. The old system has restraint, but does not 
foster the new freedom to develop human potential; that 
new freedom can be experienced, but only without restraint, 
as in Johnson's case. The only workable restraints are 
Western, yet they fail, creating a new prison, in the case 
of Benjamin, who has totally internalized them. They fail 
because freedom also includes the possibility of expressing 
one's self in culturally familiar ways. It is as if Cary dis-
covered this other freedom — one with which he was to 
become more concerned — in the process of working out 
his ideas about Afr ica through the writing of his novel. 
However, freedom — new and old, political, material and 
psychological — and restraint are not compatible; the 
tension between "abandon and responsibility" is not resolved. 
The stalemate may be inevitable in Cary's metaphysical 
terms: no-one really completely grows up, although some 
come closer than others; the comedy of freedom is also 
the tragedy of freedom; we always tread a line between 
absolutism and chaos. But Cary was certainly concerned 
about a solution to the political problem, or at least a way 
of understanding the problem in order to make life better 
for Africans. 
In The Case for African Freedom, it is as if Cary began 
to understand that "giving" freedom and "giving" educa-
tion are more complicated things than he suspected be-
cause people have their own systems of ideas which inter-
act with what they understand of what is presented to 
them. He talked to a Nigerian chief who made him see 
briefly that people do not necessarily accept what you give 
them as you define it. The result is that the most well-
intentioned giver may look like a hypocrite without knowing 
it; the same phenomenon accounts for some reviewers' 
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responses and African responses to Cary's novel. The 
Nigerian chief was told he was "free" to exericse his 
powers as a traditional ruler; as a result he exercised his 
powers, or misused them, in Cary's terms, in order to close 
a trade route troubled by murder and robbery. He was 
later deposed. 
I remember an old chief compla in ing to me, "Yes, you say 
we musn't catch slaves, but a l l our land is a slave." 
" H o w did I know it was wrong to catch the foreign 
merchants — they were buying a l l the o i l and my people 
had none. You say I a m a chief but now I am a fool 
and a slave. . . ." 
I did not understand the force of this old man's bitter 
complaint. I thought i t was enough to say, "I give you 
freedom to act, car ry on. " I did not realize his feelings 
when he discovered that what he thought was a reason-
able act, was to me stupid and wrong. . . . 
He meant that i t was not much good te l l ing an old 
m a n to take his freedom, i f he could not understand the 
new order. . . . (Case, pp. 25-26) 
When Cary then writes: "It is not a question of pouring 
the West into an open container: You cannot give liberty 
to a people by a wave of the hand, as you throw open a 
cage . . . " (Case, p. 26), he sounds as if he has begun to 
understand that these people are not open or empty con-
tainers. But his comment here still rests on the assumption 
that there is only one valuable kind of freedom, in terms 
of which African social life is a series of cages. The 
emphasis falls on the fact that political freedom does not 
guarantee true creative freedom, on the fact that the cages 
must be opened slowly (with the help of all the benefits 
Cary encouraged), on the fact that people such as the 
chief must be educated with long views, not on the fact 
that the contents (which are not all products of autocratic 
systems anyway) are going to make the assimilation of 
what is "given" — whether "freedom from fear" or health 
care and education — far more problematic than Cary 
thinks. There is no recognition here, as there is implicitly 
in the novel, that the new "freedoms" may turn into 
cages, if the receivers are taught to despise what gave 
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them joy in the past. Cary seemed to feel that the "tribe," 
like some lower evolutionary form, would disperse on its 
own account, once European ideas became available.1 5 
Perhaps too confident that education will make possible 
the kind of acceptance and understanding of the values of 
modern, democratic technological society that he has, he 
does not realize that this education, too, will be interpreted 
in terms of the receiver's learned structure of ideas. 
Interestingly enough, the view that finally emerges from 
Mister Johnson, of the African hopelessly lost between two 
worlds, unable to mediate between them, anticipates the 
view in a recent work of sociology, concerning the legacy 
of colonialism: Colin Turnbull's The Lonely African (New 
York: Doubleday), 1963. The African's "loneliness" is the 
result of a situation in which the old sanctions are no 
longer given full credence and the new are, understandably, 
both not fully understood and discredited, in part because 
they inevitably appear to be practised hypocritically, or, in 
fact, are. Johnson's apparent amorality and the damaging 
of the pride that is only hinted at in the novel (in favor of 
Johnson's resilience, which is not only the resilience of 
the artist, but, in Cary's view, the resilience of primitive 
people16) call out for explanation in such terms. He is 
damned if he tries to live up to the models placed before 
him — which he inevitably perceives in ways partially 
formed by the culture he already possesses; his efforts may 
actually increase negative response to him. On the other 
hand, he can in no sense return to the bush, which he has 
been taught is beneath him, and which he has fully intern-
alized as such. These terms are in fact concordant with 
the implicit structure of observations in the novel. 
Johnson's "jump," his willingness to try on new situ-
ations, his apparent ability to bear no resentments, even 
his "creative vitality," his desire to please which may 
misread the clues, are, I think, characteristic of a type of 
African one can indeed still meet.17 Those who recognized 
a truth to their experiences in Cary's portrait are not 
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wrong. However, this personality is indeed a role, a face 
presented to the European world. It no more represents 
the whole person than Benjamin's role does. 
Cary's "universal" rubric "Creation," and his theme of 
our "universal" childishness can, in fact, only account for 
the role, because they hide a very definite bias. Cary's 
conception of Africa as a place that had to be reshaped, a 
place whose restraints could not give shape to any of the 
new freedoms in a world of individuals, amounted to think-
ing of Africa as a blank slate. This view of Africa is of 
course parallel to Cary's view of Johnson as a blank slate, 
a universal child because he is a child in the specific 
situation. If the only grown-ups are by definition Western, 
Johnson must remain a child. This underlying concept 
explains the possibility of Cary's casting Mister Johnson 
as a universal type — the universal child — as much as 
Cary's liberalism, his desire to see all humans as fund-
amentally the same, explains his casting of Johnson as a 
universal type, who is initially, but not consistently, in 
parallel with the other "children" of the novel. The univer-
sal intentions communicated in the parallelism of characters 
and the thematic imagery are finally belied in the differ-
ential treatment of Johnson. It is the very assumption 
of the universality of his theme, then, obscuring, as it 
does, his particular biases, that contributes, along with 
his lack of knowledge of Johnson's "inside," to Cary's 
failure to treat Johnson in a universal context, as a person 
who has a culture. This paradox accounts for the claims 
of both those readers who found the book disturbingly 
patronizing and those who found that claim disturbing. 
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n I n his discussion of indirect rule i n colonial A f r i ca , Ca ry did state 
that i t was not the f o rm of government that mattered, but the 
opportunity for the ind iv idua l to indulge his tastes and de-
velop his talents (Case, pp. 59-60). Bu t elsewhere it is clear 
that only technological ly advanced democracies meet his 
cr i ter ia. " B u t the ideal state, that wh i ch gives to a l l i ts 
members the best chance of happiness and real izat ion, and 
makes the best use of their different powers, is obviously 
that w i th the greatest var ie ty of social and economic 
organization. It is not the tr ibe w i th its simple pattern of 
existence, but the h igh ly complex modern state, l ike the 
U.S.A. or the northern European democracies, which gives to 
its subjects the greatest l iberty of w i l l and act ion" (Case, 
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n A r t and Reality: Ways of the Creative Process (New York, 1961), 
pp. 21-22. 
1 - "Ca r y ' s preface to the Car fax edition of Castle Corner shows 
that the whole t r i logy was to 'raise such questions as: Is 
there a f ina l shape of society to be founded upon the common 
needs and hopes of men? ' Bu t as he there admits, a story 
which is f i rst and foremost concerned w i th persons could 
not answer universa l po l i t ica l questions. ' And i n the upshot 
I abandoned the whole enterprise, and turned to wr i te about 
the simplest of characters i n a simple background, w i th the 
simplest of themes, Mis te r Johnson, the art ist of his own 
joy fu l t a l e ' " (Mahood, p. 169). The in i t i a l question was more 
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was " ins ide " Johnson. The recognition of " s imp l i c i t y " may 
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1 3 " I t must never be forgotten that even in the worst days, . . . 
the missions were tak ing their schools and hospitals, and a 
rel igion, which at its crudest was inf ini te ly better than any 
native creed, to the t r ibes" (Case, p. 19). 
^ " C a t c h i n g Up w i th H is tory , " [A Rev iew of Black Power, by 
R i chard Wr i gh t ] i n The Case for African Freedom and Other 
Writings on Africa, p. 222. 
1 5 " A f r i c a n tribes do not wa i t to be destroyed by European in-
fluences; they disband. The foreigner does not need to 
attack the t r i ba l idea; at the f i rst r i s ing of the other idea 
of l iberty, even i n its crudest shape, i t begins to grow pale 
and weak" (Case, p. 40). 
1 6 Johnson 's qual i ty of " j u m p " seems to be l inked i n Cary 's mind 
w i th what he thought of as the resilience of pr imit ives who 
are " l i k e ch i ld ren " i n the sense " that they do not bear 
resentment, they do not remember bitterness. . . ." They are 
too busy i n the struggle for l i fe. (Case, p. 75). 
1 7 O n the basis of my own experience in West A f r i c a (Ghana) , 
1967-68. 
j 
